Since the European constitutional process depends on unanimous consent by all 27 members, the Irish vote effectively sinks this version of the new constitution, much as Dutch and French voters sank the previous version in 2005.

The Irish vote was not a landslide. Only 54 percent of the voters cast their ballots against the constitution. But that misses the point. Whether it had been 54 percent for or against the constitution, the point was that the Irish were deeply divided. In every country, there is at least a substantial minority that opposes the constitution. Given that all 27 EU countries must approve the constitution, the odds against some country not sinking it are pretty long. The Europeans are not going to get a strengthened constitution this way.

But the deeper point is that you can’t create a constitution without a deep consensus about needing it. Even when there is — as the United States showed during its Civil War — critical details not settled by consensus can lead to conflict. In the case of the United States, the issues of the relative power of states and the federal government, along with the question of slavery, ripped the country apart. They could only be settled by war and a series of amendments to the U.S. Constitution forced through by the winning side after the war.

The Constitutional Challenge

Creating a constitution is not like passing a law — and this treaty was, in all practical terms, a constitution. Constitutions do not represent public policy, but a shared vision of the regime and the purpose of the nation. The U.S. Constitution was born in battle. It emerged from a long war of independence and from the lessons learned in that war about the need for a strong executive to wage war, a strong congress to allocate funds and raise revenue, and a judiciary to interpret the constitution. War, along with the teachings of John Locke, framed the discussions in Philadelphia, because the founders’ experience in a war where there was only a congress and no president convinced them of the need for a strong executive. And even that was not enough to prevent civil war over the issue of state sovereignty versus federal sovereignty. Making a constitution is hard.

The European constitution was also born in battle, but in a different way. For centuries, the Europeans had engaged in increasingly savage wars. The question they wanted to address was how to banish war from Europe. In truth, that decision was not in their hands, but in the hands of Americans and Soviets. But the core issue remained: how to restrain European savagery. The core idea was relatively simple. European wars arose from European divisions; and, for centuries, those divisions ran along national lines. If a United States of Europe could be created on the order of the United States of America, then the endless battling of France, Germany and England would be eliminated.

In the exhaustion of the postwar world — really lasting through the lives of the generation that endured World War II — the concept was deeply seductive. Europe after World War II was exhausted in every sense. It allowed its empires to slip away with a combination of indifference and relief. What Europeans wanted postwar was to make a living and be left alone by ideology and nationalism; they had experienced quite enough of those two. Even France under the influence of Charles de Gaulle, the champion of the idea of the nation-state and its interests, could not arouse a spirit of nationalism anywhere close to what had been.

There is a saying that some people are exhausted and confuse their state with virtue. If that is true, then it is surely true of Europe in the last couple of generations. The European Union reflected these origins. It began as a pact — the European Community — of nations looking to reduce tariff barriers. It evolved into a nearly Europe-wide grouping of countries bound together in a trade bloc, with many of those countries sharing a common currency. Its goal was not the creation of a more perfect union, or, as the Americans put it, a “novus ordo seclorum.” It was not to be the city on the hill. Its commitment was to a more prosperous life, without genocide. Though not exactly inspiring, given the brutality of European history, it was not a trivial goal.

The problem was that when push came to shove, the European Community evolved into the European Union, which consisted of four things:

1. A free trade zone with somewhat synchronized economic polices, not infrequently overridden by the sovereign power of member states.

2. A complex bureaucracy designed to oversee the harmonization of European economies. This was seen as impenetrable and engaged in intensive and intrusive work from the trivial to the extremely significant, charged with defining everything from when a salami may be called a salami and whether Microsoft was a monopoly.

3. A single currency and central bank to which 15 of the 27 EU members subscribed.

4. Had Ireland voted differently, a set of proto-institutions would have been created — complete with a presidency and foreign policy chief — which would have given the European Union the trappings of statehood. The president, who would rotate out of office after a short time, would have been the head of one of the EU member states.

Rejecting a European Regime

The Irish referendum was all about transforming the fourth category into a regime. The Irish rejected it not because they objected to the first three sets of solutions — they have become the second-wealthiest country in Europe per capita under their aegis. They objected to it because they did not want to create a European regime. As French and Dutch voters have said before, the Irish said they want a free trade zone. They will put up with the Brussels bureaucracy even though its intrusiveness and lack of accountability troubles them. They can live with a single currency so long as it does not simply become a prisoner of German and French economic policy. But they do not want to create a European state.

The French and German governments do want to create such a state. As with the creation of the United States, the reasons have to do with war, past and future. Franco-German animosity helped created the two world wars of the 20th century. Those two powers now want a framework for preventing war within Europe. They also — particularly the French — want a vehicle for influencing the course of world events. In their view, the European Union, as a whole, has a gross domestic product comparable to that of the United States. It should be the equal of the United States in shaping the world. This isn’t simply a moral position, but a practical one. The United States throws its weight around because it can, frequently harming Europe’s interests. The French and Germans want to control the United States.

To do this, they need to move beyond having an economic union. They need to have a European foreign and defense policy. But before they can have that, they need a European government that can carry out this policy. And before they can have a European government they must have a European regime, before which they must have a European constitution that enumerates the powers of the European president, parliament and courts. They also need to specify how these officials will be chosen.

The French and Germans would welcome all this if they could get it. They know, given population, economic power and so on, that they would dominate the foreign policy created by a European state. Not so the Irish and Danes; they understand they would have little influence on the course of European foreign policy. They already feel the pain of having little influence on European economic policy, particularly the policies of the European Central Bank (ECB). Even the French public has expressed itself in the 2006 election about fears of Brussels and the ECB. But for countries like Ireland and Denmark, each of which fought very hard to create and retain their national sovereignty, merging into a Europe in which they would lose their veto power to a European parliamentary and presidential system is an appalling prospect.

Economists always have trouble understanding nationalism. To an economist, all human beings are concerned with maximizing their own private wealth. Economists can never deal with the empirical fact that this simply isn’t true. Many Irish fought against being cogs in a multinational British Empire. The Danes fought against being absorbed by Germany. The prospect of abandoning the struggle for national sovereignty to Europe is not particularly pleasing, even if it means economic advantage.

Europe is not going to become a nation-state in the way the United States is. It is increasingly clear that Europeans are not going to reach a consensus on a European constitution. They are not in agreement on what European institutions should look like, how elections should be held and, above all, about the relation between individual nations and a central government. The Europeans have achieved all they are going to achieve. They have achieved a free trade zone with a regulatory body managing it. They have created a currency that is optional to EU members, and from which we expect some members to withdraw from at times while others join in. There will be no collective European foreign or defense policy simply because the Europeans do not have a common interest in foreign and defense policy.

Paris Reads the Writing on the Wall

The French have realized this most clearly. Once the strongest advocates of a federated Europe, the French under President Nicolas Sarkozy have started moving toward new strategies. Certainly, they remain committed to the European Union in its current structure, but they no longer expect it to have a single integrated foreign and defense policy. Instead, the French are pursuing initiatives by themselves. One aspect of this involves drawing closer to the United States on some foreign policy issues. Rather than trying to construct a single Europe that might resist the United States — former President Jacques Chirac’s vision — the French are moving to align themselves to some degree with American policies. Iran is an example.

The most intriguing initiative from France is the idea of a Mediterranean union drawing together the countries of the Mediterranean basin, from Algeria to Israel to Turkey. Apart from whether these nations could coexist in such a union, the idea raises the question of whether France (or Italy or Greece) can simultaneously belong to the European Union and another economic union. While questions — such as whether North African access to the French market would provide access to the rest of the European Union — remain to be answered, the Germans have strongly rejected this French vision.

The vision derives directly from French geopolitical reality. To this point, the French focus has been on France as a European country whose primary commitment is to Europe. But France also is a Mediterranean country, with historical ties and interests in the Mediterranean basin. France’s geographical position gives it options, and it has begun examining those options independent of its European partners.

The single most important consequence of the Irish vote is that it makes clear that European political union is not likely to happen. It therefore forces EU members to consider their own foreign and defense policies — and, therefore, their own geopolitical positions. Whether an economic union can survive in a region of political diversity really depends on whether the diversity evolves into rivalry. While that has been European history, it is not clear that Europe has the inclination to resurrect national rivalries.

At the same time, if France does pursue interests independent of the Germans, the question will be this: Will the mutual interest in economic unity override the tendency toward political conflict? The idea was that Europe would moot the question by creating a federation. That isn’t going to happen, so the question is on the table. And that question can be framed simply: When speaking of political and military matters, is it reasonable any longer to use the term Europe to denote a single entity? Europe, as it once was envisioned, appears to have disappeared in Ireland.

Tell Stratfor What You Think

This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com

Poate ca asa vom intelege cu totii ca noi, fiecare in parte si cu totii impreuna, fiecare cu optiunile sale, fiecare diferit de altii si asemanator cu ei,  suntem societatea civila.

Atentie!
Primul FlashMob organizat in Cluj-Napoca ca raspuns la ororile ce le pregateste Italia la adresa romanilor. Aveti detalii organizatorice in link-ul de mai jos; veniti in numar mare sa demonstram ca ne pasa si sa nu uitati niciun moment ca “maine” ati putea fi dvs. tinta safariului…
http://sorinplaton.wordpress.com/2008/05/21/va-invitam-la-primul-flashmob-in-cluj-napoca/

1=

p.s.Cititi si dati mai departe!

Din Portugalia despre România s-a văzut o singură ştire, că a ajuns campioană la fotbal în România o echipă cu 8 portughezi.  Nimic despre Zeus...

În România, la fel ca în toate ţările din fostul bloc răsăritean, singurul preţ nealiniat la un fel de normă europeană e preţul forţei de muncă. Pretextul public a fost mereu acela că productivitatea muncii trebuie să determine preţul forţei de  muncă (ceea ce e corect). Iar productivitatea în România e foarte mică (ceea ce e în bună măsură fals...).

Cei circa 3 milioane de români plecaţi la muncă prin Spania, Italia si aiurea prin Europa de vest sunt consecinţa directă a acestei stări de fapt. Iar consecinţa economică şi socială directă este că singura lor contribuţie la bunăstarea economică de acasă inseamnă banii trimişi de ei din câştig, care înseamnă doar o mică parte din rezultatul muncii lor. Partea mare a rezultatului rămâne în acele ţări şi asigură evitarea crizelor economice de acolo.

Cum se face că e în mare parte falsă aserţiunea că productivitatea muncii în România e mult mai mică decât în Occident?  În primul rând prin mecanismul de calcul.  Se folosesţe ca argument productivitatea exprimată în bani, în locul productivităţii exprimate în volum al producţiei.

Aparent e corect pentru că banul poate fi singurul numitor comun. Doar că asta nu e mereu adevărat. Fără a intra în argumente sofisticate, oricine poate constata că un român care culege manual căpşuni în Spania nu culege mai multe decât în România. Şi totuşi e plătit de 10 ori mai mult în Spania.  Putem merge şi la celălalt capăt al spectrului: un medic în România produce  concret cel puţin la fel ca unul în Germania: nu operează mai puţin, nu îngrijeşte mai puţini bolnavi. Ca să nu mai vorbim despre companiile multinaţionale din România: dacă e vorba de producţie industrială, tehnologia şi produsul sunt aceleaşi, de multe ori managerii sunt straini, în mod firesc productivitatea de volum trebuie să fie tot pe acolo (şi cam este...). Dar şi în economia simplă: e greu de presupus că un brutar din Dorohoi face mai puţină pâine decât unui din Paris. Şi nici pâniea nu e mai ieftină.  Şi exemplele pot continua.

E adevărat că în agricultură, de exemplu producţia la hectar e mică. Doar că şi aici e o făcătură la mijloc. Productivitatea muncii calculată în bani presupune implicit producţia a ceva destinat schimbului economic (vînzării). Însă traducerea corectă a denumirii de agricultură de subzistenţă e sector agricol în afara circuitului economic; pentru că populaţia din acest sector nu vinde şi nu cumpără, deci nu e forţă de mucă salariată care să producă ceva destinat schimbului. Astfel nici productţia agricolă şi nici populaţia din agricultura de subzistenţă nu au ce căuta în datele pentru calculul productivităţii, pentru că distorsionează rezultatul.

In fine, calculul în bani al productivităţii muncii e afectat de preţul de schimb, ca element de bază în calculul valorii. Există prin urmare o distorsionare a rezultatului în funcţie de preţurile practicate în ţare respectivă. Există desigur corecţia prin paritatea puterii de cumpărare, dar aceasta ia în calcul un indice mediu al preţurilor, asemănător cu mecanismul din coşul mediu zilnic şi la fel de artificial ca acesta.

Salariile mici nu sunt rezultatul guvernărilor de dreapta. Pe timpul ultimei guvernări PSD, puterea reală de cumpărare a salariaţilor a scăzut aproape constant în pofida creşterii economice. Nu vreau să speculez asupre motivelor şi nu vreau să fac vreo teorie a conspiraţiei.

Ceea ce contează sunt faptele, iar acestea conduc spre constatarea că există în mod obiectiv o disparitate artificială între Est şi Vest în privinţa preţului forţei de muncă. Sindicatele au înţeles acest lucru.

E de presupus că o astfel de temă legitimă va deveni prioritară pentru forţele de stânga din ţările Central şi Est Europene, la fel cum în Germania toţi anii 90 au fost dominaţi de tema disparităţilor între landurile fostei RDG şi cele ale fostei RFG.  Rămâne de văzut cine, când şi cum va prelua tema în România.

Aşa cum spune Elena Udrea, in extaz patriotic:M-am simtit mandra de tara mea, de Presedintele meu. Traiesc un profund sentiment de mandrie nationala, de patriotism adevarat:
1. Nu se ridică vizele pentru America

2. Cu Teo Peter rămâne cum am stabilit.

3.  Mai trimitem oameni in Afganistan

4. Ucraina nu e inclusă în MAP

5. Georgia face Membership Action Plan la groapa cu nisip.

6. Macedonia dă mărunt din buze şi pleacă trântind uşa.

7. 50 de puşti bezmetici au fost scoşi din hală şi duşi la poliţie.

1. Să intre Ucraina necondiţionat în MAP. Insula Şerpilor? Canalul Bîstroe? Combinatul Krivoi Rog? Bucovina? Transnistria? Nu avem nici un mijloc de presiune...

2. Să intre Georgia în MAP. Abhazia, Osetia? Eh, poate trimitem trupe şi acolo şi ne batem cu  rusii, mama lor.

3.  Să adere Albania la NATO. Ce facem cu pretenţiile la Albania mare care să includă Kosovo şi părţi din Macedonia? Doar un posibil nou război în Balcani cu participarea directă a NATO. Ne băgăm!

4. Macedonia? Ca la punctul 3.

5. Croaţia. Aici lucrurile sunt ceva mai clare. Doar ca exista detalii legate de construcţia numită Bosnia-Herţegovina.

6. Afganistan? Trimitem trupe suplimentare. În Sud, că acolo se moare glorios călcând cu maşina bombele artizanale.

Acuma se pune întrebarea de ca a făcut Băsescu asta, în condiţiile în care era limpede că 1,2 şi 4 mai sunt şi perdante din start? Să fie trădare sau prostie simplă?

Bineînţeles că râşniţeţe de vorbe prezidenţioase ne vor spune că e vorba de consecvenţa politică a Marelui Boc - 5 minute. 

Dacă ne amintim că pe la alegerile din 2004 se zvonea în târg că ambasada americană a intervenit direct în seara alegerilor ca să nu iasă Năstase (că avea o imagine bad for business) - şi că aşa au ieşit 50-50 plus ceva - şi dacă ne uitam cum se duce la vale acum persoana Băsescu, ne putem întreba dacă nu e vorba doar de o încercare penibilă de a-şi asigura sprijinul americanilor la alegerile care bat la uşă.

Uită însă că nici pe Năstase nu l-a ajutat contractul cu Bechtel. 

Tovarăşul colonel Ciocan de la inspectoratul de miliţie al municipiului Bucureşti a explicat locuitorilor de la oraşe şi sate abnegaţia lucrătorilor de miliţie în combaterea acestor manifestări. Aceşti fii curajoşi ai clasei muncitoare, căliţi în întrecerea socialistă, strîns uniţi în jurul partidului şi al secretarului să general, tovarăşul Traian Băsescu, nu au precupeţit nici un efort în asigurarea desfăşurării în bune condiţiuni a lucrărilor Plenarei.

Trăiască lupta pentru pace! Trăiască şi înflorească scumpa noastră patrie, Republica Socialistă România!

1. Spoiala de Samit. Pe Calea Victoriei ca să nu se strepezească ochii străinezi, pe blocurile cenuşii faţadele scorojite, pervazele geamurilor, fierul balcoanelor, praful , rugina şi funinginea au fost acoperite uniform cu vopsea dată cu bidineaua.  
2. Culoarul unic de curăţenie. Toată energia autorităţilor s-a consumat pe culoarul pe care merg ştabii. 50 de metri mai încolo praful şi mizeria ne desfată în continuare.
3.  Ascunde-te vierme. Locatarilor din blocuri li s-a recomandat călduros să nu deschdă ferestrele, să nu tragă perdelele şi în general să dispară, pentru că lunetiştii o să ii împuşte,  ai dreacu' terorişti.
4. Închis de summit. Multe magazine din centru vor fi închise între 1 şi 4 aprilie. Aici nea Nicu ar fi băgat marfă şi oamenii muncii fruntaşi în întrecerea socialistă ar fi fost aduşi cu autobuzele să se arate cumpărători.
5. Grija faţă de om. La chemarea partidului, cadre de nădejde din toate colţurile ţării, elemente sănătoase, tunse şi cu uniforme noi au venit să stea pe stradă. O tînără lovită de maşină lângă dânşii a fost lăsată să moară în ţărână pe şoseaua Kiseleff. Ca un câine, fără ca miliţienii măcar să schiţeze o mângâiere sau o vorbă bună. Să nu li se murdărească uniformele.   
6. De 3 ori ura. Autorităţile ne arată din nou că e oraşul lor şi nu al nostru. În general existenţa noastră e deranjantă. Nu vor mai tolera mult timp ca oraşul ăsta să fie locuit.  Ura şi dispreţul măriilor lor se exprimă în toate felurile, doar-doar vom pricepe mesajul.  Ei ne urăsc. E clar?

Doar detaliile nu se ştiu: Ce se discută la reuniunea asta? Ce decizii sunt pe masă? Cum afectează asta România?

The President will then go to Romania so he can participate in the NATO summit and conduct bilateral meetings with Romanian authorities. The President will travel to Constadt, on Romania's Black Sea coast, to meet with President Vasesque at his official retreat. Romania is a close partner of the United States and has proven to be a valuable NATO ally since it joined the Alliance in 2004. The two Presidents will discuss a range of bilateral issues.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080326-3.html

Înţelegem mai puţin de ce ei au şi noi nu. Ne e uşor să dăm vina pe istorie, geografie şi sărăcie: ne spunem că sunt factori externi. Dacă şi noi am fi primit de la Dumnezeu ce au primit ăia, ehe, ce am fi făcut! Dar n-am avut noroc...Că altfel din născare noi suntem buni, poate cei mai buni.

Oare?   Oricât ar fi de dureros e bine să facem şi un pic de introspecţie. Poate că nici noi nu suntem perfecţi. Eu cred că ne lipseşte gena măreţiei. Un mare neamţ a glosat pe marginea diferenţei între frumos şi măreţ. El dădea acolo exemplu muntele: acesta e de fapt măreţ, nu frumos.

Noi avem un simţ dezvoltat al frumosului, suficient de puternic încât să şi facem lucruri frumoase. Mânaţi de simţul frumosului suntem capabili, în ciuda temeramentului nostru de cursă scurtă, să depunem mutl efort şi multă migală pentru ca lucrul să iasă frumos. E suficient să vedem porţile maramureşene, alesăturile costumului popular, ori meticulozitatea formelor lui Brâncuşi.

Ne e atrofiat însă simţul măreţiei. Măcar dacă ne lipsea cu totul, nu îi simţeam lipsa. Aşa el există suficient ca să putem recunoaşte măreţia produsului finit, dar insuficient ca să ne împingă la efortul de a face lucruri măreţe. Atunci când vreunul dintre noi - printr-un defect de fabricaţie - se apucă de aşa ceva, vine corul popular care îngroapă totul în ridicol sau dispreţ. Cred că două exemple sunt suficiente: Casa Republicii (a Poporului, mai nou Palatul Parlamentului) şi Canalul Dunăre-Marea Neagră. Am fost cu toţii atât de mult deranjaţi de efortul cerut şi atît de tare ne-a îngreţoşat Ceauşescu, încât nici până azi nu reuşim să le percepem măreţia. Putem avea discuţii despre frumosul lor, gusturile sunt diverse.

După 89 scăpată din chingi ţara a fost dezvoltată de oameni după chipul şi asemănarea lor: chestii mici şi mărunţişuri. Nimic major. Totul cu ţîrîita.

In timp ce mass-media e plina de povesti cu Cioaca, iar dezbaterea politica e dominata de CNSAS, dupa ce istoriile cu Norica Nicolai s-au fumat, iar conclavurile de pre-campanie ale partidelor nu au emis nimic demn de retinut.

Asa ca intre doua prostii, un discurs in franceza si un cascat de plictiseala, nebagat de seama decat prin festivismul escalei lui Sarkozy, Romania a ratificat ceea ce e noua Constitutie Europeana. Textul Tratatului de la Lisabona

Ce contine? Cum ne afecteaza? De cand? Quasi-totalitatea natiunii habar n-are. Cam la fel si "clasa politica". Aproape la fel de multi nici macar nu stiu cu ce se ocupa tratatul de la Lisabona. Bine ca se dezbate taxa auto la televizor si se face referendum despre Basescu sau uninominal.

Detaliile marunte gen Constitutia Europei se voteaza in mod festiv si fara discutii. Bravos natiune!

Opinii?

The Unraveling of Russia’s Europe Policy
January 22,2008

By Peter Zeihan

Russian President Vladimir Putin and his anointed successor, Dmitri Medvedev, were in Bulgaria on Jan. 17. The point of the trip was to put the crowning touch on a Russian effort to hook Europe into Moscow’s energy orbit. After a touch of bitter rhetoric about how Russia and Bulgaria were “doomed to be partners,” Putin agreed to grant equal rights to the South Stream natural gas pipeline Moscow hopes to lay through Bulgaria. Yet the tension of the meeting and the concessions that Putin had to make simply to get permission are symptomatic of a broad unraveling of Russian foreign policy toward Europe.

The Russian Scheme

Russia often has had a love-hate relationship with Europe. Dating back to the time of the czars, Moscow has had to aim for a mix of economic integration and military intimidation to make its voice heard. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the degradation of the Red Army, the military intimidation factor has largely fallen away, leaving economics as the primary method of impacting Europe. In this, Russia has forces at its disposal every bit as useful as Soviet tank divisions. Cold War-era infrastructure provides the 27-member European Union with roughly one-quarter of the natural gas and oil it consumes. Such dependence might not be sufficient to force European deference, but it certainly guarantees that Europe will hear Russia out.

Natural gas is unique among the various industrial and energy commodities. The combination of its gaseous nature and the sheer bulk that is required to power large economies (the European Union uses more than half a trillion cubic meters of the stuff a year) means that it can only be efficiently transported via pipeline. While oil and coal and alumina and wheat and platinum can all be loaded into trucks, rail cars and tankers — allowing any producer to supply any consumer — natural gas can travel only along existing pipeline networks. Canada therefore only supplies the United States and Russia only supplies former Soviet republics, Turkey and Europe. This contained relationship gives Russia leverage in a way that its mineral and oil wealth do not. And so it is here that the Europeans have tried — with some success — to slice through the ties that bind.

Putin has sought to strengthen this energy leverage via two pipeline projects in particular. The two natural gas lines — Nord Stream, which would run under the Baltic Sea from St. Petersburg to Germany; and the aforementioned South Stream, which would run under the Black Sea from near Novorossiysk to Bulgaria — would increase the European dependency on Russian natural gas from 25 percent to 35 percent of its total consumption.
Pipeline Map

Economically, neither of these projects makes sense. Building long underwater pipelines to Europe — a region with which the former Soviet Union shares a land connection — is simply asinine; landlines typically cost less than a third of their underwater equivalents. Additionally, Nord Stream would be the world’s longest underwater natural gas pipeline and South Stream the deepest.

But the Russians did not plan these projects with profitability in mind — having tripled their natural gas export prices since 2000, they have profit aplenty. Instead, they are thinking of the Americans. The Kremlin’s Cold War mantra has long been that if the Europeans can be neutralized, then American influence can be purged from Europe. Ergo, American presidents dating back to Ronald Reagan have opposed (explicitly or not) any expansion of trade and energy links between Europe and Russia. And there also is the minor detail of Russia hating to involve transit states such as Belarus and Ukraine that are able to siphon off Russian energy en route to hard-currency-paying Europeans.

Given the political nature of these projects, then, the numbers have always been a touch wacky. The Russians have underestimated the costs of both of the natural gas lines to a humorous degree (likely by a factor of four or more), they lack the technological ability to build the lines themselves and they have insisted that the Europeans foot the bills. Specifically they expect ENI to pay for South Stream, and BASF, Gasunie and E.On to cover Nord Stream. Topping it off, they expect themselves — not the countries on which the pipes will lie or the companies that finance and build them — to own the projects when they are completed.
The European Response

The Europeans certainly exchanged some worried looks when these projects were proposed and Russia started assembling consortia to work on them. But in January 2006 an event happened that galvanized European action to wean the Continent off of Russian energy. A natural gas pricing dispute with Ukraine resulted in a brief suspension of deliveries to Europe (Russian natural gas deliveries to Europe currently transit Ukraine and Belarus). Russia attempted to leverage this energy crisis to force the Europeans to back Russian policy in Ukraine. Specifically, Moscow wanted Europe to repudiate Ukraine’s Orange Revolution against Russia’s preferred Ukrainian government and recognize Russian suzerainty in the former Soviet Union.

The strategy backfired and sparked intense interest across Europe in diversifying sources of petroleum and reducing total demand. European states and firms launched alternative supply lines, rafts of terminals were built to import natural gas shipped by tanker in more expensive liquefied form, a new fleet of nuclear reactors were commissioned, and the European Union adopted ambitious alternative energy and conservation programs (which incidentally dovetailed nicely with Europe’s anti-greenhouse-gas plans). The formal European goal is now to reduce total energy consumption by 20 percent — with 20 percent of the remaining total coming from alternative sources — by 2020. The EU states are still squabbling over who needs to bear what specific burdens, but there is no disagreement as to the goal — or the reasons it exists in the first place.

There are two questions remaining.
The Question of Time

First, how long will it be until the Russians realize that their energy tool is no longer sharp? The answer is, longer than you might think.

The Russians have persevered in their pursuit of these projects despite increasingly obvious signs that the Europeans not only are not interested in the projects, they are not interested in the Russians. In part it is because, if Moscow’s plan were realized, it would be a very good plan indeed, as it would harness Europe irrevocably to Russia.

But mostly the lack of realization is because of Russia’s historical blind spot. Russia’s wide-open geography means that it has few barriers to invasion. Consequently, Russian history is one of occasional foreign occupation, which has resulted in a culture that mixes xenophobia, bitterness, persecution and a sense of entitlement in equal measure. This idea of “we have suffered so much so you should do what we say” — a sort of superiority complex based on an inferiority complex — clouds Russian strategic thinking and contributes to the seeming inability of the Kremlin to sense that the Chinese are stealing Central Asia from under the Russian nose.

It also explains why the Russians have not realized that the Europeans are moving away from them in as expeditious manner as feasible. The European reactions to Russian entreaties on these natural gas projects can best be summated as humoring the Russians. Few states want an out-and-out breach in their relations with Moscow, which could result in an actual and immediate energy cutoff before the Europeans are prepared to sever economic ties. So they have been taking advantage of Russia’s cultural blind spot while quietly developing alternatives.

This is doubly true for firms such as E.On and Gasunie, which supposedly are involved in consortia to build the projects. All are key purchasers of Russian energy exports and have found it easier to feign support than to be bluntly honest and so risk losing reliable deliveries of Russia natural gas. The one possible exception might be ENI, which is desperate for any source of natural gas to maintain its market position in Italy. But even here, it is far from clear that a single firm — even one as large as ENI — can shoulder realistically the massive burden of financing and building a project as questionable as South Stream by itself.

Years from now, Putin’s Jan. 17 trip to Bulgaria will likely be seen as the turning point in the European-Russia power balance, because that is when the humoring broke down. As Putin was en route to Bulgaria, Sofia insisted that, should South Stream come about, it will be Sofia — not Moscow — that holds a majority share in the portion on Bulgarian territory. A compromise — a 50-50 ownership split — was ultimately struck, simply because there is little Moscow can do to punish Bulgaria without deeply damaging its own interests. Bulgaria does not border Russia (or any former Soviet republic) and since it is a transit state for Russian natural gas to third countries, it cannot simply be cut off.

Bulgaria is hardly the bravest or most powerful of the EU states. It also is not among the crop that has done the most to diversify its energy consumption away from Russian sources. Consequently, it stands to reason that the nod-and-smile approach that has dominated European attitudes toward all things Russian is starting to crack. In the first 10 months of 2007 alone, total European demand for natural gas already dipped sharply, according to International Energy Agency data — reversing a 50-year upward trend.
Nat gas imports demand

Add in increased alternative supplies that are not merely prospective (such as the Nord and South Streams), but actually under construction — within three years Europe will have established alternatives for at least two-thirds of the natural gas Russia currently supplies — and Russia’s energy grip on Europe is slackening quickly.

In short, Europe is reorienting its entire energy sector to eliminate the “Russian factor.” This is allowing the Europeans to take a firmer line on Russia in other areas as well. For example, on Jan. 17 the European Union gave Ukraine the green light to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Until recently the Europeans had expected Ukraine under a pro-Russian government to join the WTO at the same time as Russia, so the Europeans played softball with the Russians in accession negotiations. But now that a pro-Western coalition has returned to power in Kiev, and since a pro-Western Ukraine will have the ability to block Russian accession on its own, the Europeans sense an opportunity to pry Ukraine out of Russia’s economic orbit and lash it into Europe’s. Consequently European negotiators have switched to hardball tactics on economic issues ranging from timber t o transport, pushing back — yet again — serious efforts to bring Russia itself into the WTO.
ALTERNATIVE NATURAL GAS SUPPLY ROUTES

Such isolation is far more damning than it sounds. According to the European Commission, if energy is shorn from Russian-European trade, then the new (much reduced) total value of that trade shrinks to an amount equal to that of the European Union’s trade with Iceland, a country with fewer than half a million people.
The Question of Response

That brings us to the second question. What will the Russians do about it?

For Russia, the challenge is not about the lost income — between rainy day funds and currency reserves, Moscow has socked away nearly $700 billion — but lost influence. Russia’s other exports, primarily metals, minerals and weapons, still fetch a pretty penny and put Russian fingers in pots the world over, but none grant it influence where it truly matters: in Europe.

Russia faces a near future in which the economic might of Europe will reinforce the geopolitical ambitions of the United States. Washington’s desire to whittle Russia back to a more manageable size is nothing new, but few realize that Brussels has its own ambitions. The Europeans would like to expand their economic reach into the bulk of the territory between the EU border and Moscow, as well as into the Caucasus. Europe does not see this as an imperialist venture, but simply as the natural order of things. The Russians, of course, see the world through a different lens, and European plans would be even more damaging in the long run to Russian interests than will American efforts, as they would make these border territories not only politically unreliable, but rather like the Baltics: firmly integrated into a rival system.

If economic tools no longer are relevant, Russia will be forced to fall back on political and military tactics, including:

* Military intimidation of the Baltics and Finland.
* Reunion with Belarus and a return of the Red Army to the Polish border.
* Overt intervention in the Russian-speaking portions of Ukraine.
* Active and public participation in Georgia’s secessionist conflicts, both to block European influence and to disrupt some of those alternate energy supplies.
* Support for Europe’s various secessionist regions.

None of these options is clean and easy, and all are laden with consequences. Two of those consequences are critical enough to warrant mention here. First, any action from this list would rejuvenate NATO to the point that a Western military response, likely resulting in a new containment strategy, would be a foregone conclusion. Second, a renewed Russian confrontation with the West would certainly provide ample opportunity for China to make inroads into Central Asia and the Russian Far East, a region where Russia’s own intelligence services warn that Chinese squatters already might constitute the majority of the population. Yet with Russia’s economic toolkit impotent, such options are all that remain before the Kremlin.

Russia’s best hope is to recognize, before it is too late, that the tide is irrevocably turning. But Moscow faces one other complication in wrestling with the changing geopolitical reality — one that could critically delay an adjustment in strategies: itself.

Though Putin is undoubtedly the man in charge, he is not the only one with ambition. His inner circle is split roughly in half by a clan war between Vladislav Surkov and Sergei Ivanov. Both are loyal to Putin, but their battles have absorbed the majority of the state’s ability to deal with any issue. While the two overlords clash, the Europeans make ever-greater strides toward freeing themselves from dependence on Russian energy, steadily closing the window of opportunity for the Russians to adjust.

And when that window closes, Russia will face a world in which the United States no longer is consumed with all things Middle Eastern and the Europeans no longer are afraid of all things Russian.

Reacţiile oficiale româneşti au fost timide/timorate, un fel de batistă pe ţambal, la fel cum au fost în toţi aceşti ani. Să ne amintim că pe vremea când România aspira să fie primită în NATO şi Uniunea Europeană se sugera că ar fi bine să nu existe nici un fel de dispute sau inamiciţii cu vecinii, pentru că asta nu se cade la aspiranţii ca noi. Atunci fraţii de peste Prut nu au avut prea multe scrupule în a specula această poziţie făcând un blând şantaj în urma căruia Moldova a primit asistenţă economică suficient de consistentă din partea României ca - de exemplu - să evite intrarea în colaps ca urmare a sistării furnizării de energie electrică din Rusia şi Ucraina.

Afectiv ne simţim aproape de locuitorii din Basarabia, rezonăm cu nevoile şi problemele lor, dacă putem suntem bucuroşi să îi ajutăm cu ce avem. Însă dacă e să judecăm raţional, ajungem la concluzia că România nu are nevoie de Republica Moldova. Tot ce ne interesează este linişte la frontiera comună.

Republica Moldova e o ţară săracă, fără resurse, fără industrie semnificativă şi cu o agricultură din care se remarcă viticultura şi cultivarea tutunului. Are mari probleme sociale şi economice, implantările masive de ruşi au creat o coloană a cincea rusă puternică, criminalitate organizată asemănătoare cu aceea a tuturor statelor ex-sovietice. Teritorial e o construcţie meşteşugită la Moscova lui Stalin deoarece cuprinde o doar parte din Basarabia istorică plus o bucată de dincolo de Nistru. O serie de conflicte inter-etnice mocnesc, Transnistria e o problemă fără răspuns. Atunci cine de cine are nevoie? Cred că ei au nevoie de noi.

Mi se pare aberant că noi ne oferim voluntar să susţinem cauza Republicii Moldova în Europa, că ne zbatem să găsim modalităţi de eliminare a vizelor pentru cetăţenii moldoveni şi multe astfel de acţiuni, în condiţiile în care ei nu ne cer asta. Dacă doresc sprijinul României, trebuie ca ei să ne solicite ajutorul. Iar noi îl vom acorda în condiţiile care ne convin. De data asta Moldova trebuie să se comporte civilizat, să îşi înţeleagă corect locul şi rolul ca ţară. Vrea spre Europa, foarte bine. Trebuie să îndeplinească o serie de criterii şi să răspundă unei serii de cerinţe. La fel ca toată lumea. La fel ca România. Vrea spre Rusia, la fel de bine. E viaţa lor, pot face ce vor cu ea.

România ar trebui să nu mai permită să fie tratată ca o cârpă de şters pe jos la îndemâna jocurilor politicianiste de la Chişinău. Pentru că acesta e motivul real acţiunilor lor la adresa României. Avem interese şi obiective majore, pe care trebuie să le urmărim, iar eforturile de politică externă ar trebui concentrate în aceste direcţii. Iar aceste direcţii nu trec pe la Chişinău.

De la o vreme avem alt statut internaţional. E momentul să ne ridicăm şi statura cu decenţă şi demnitate. Apoi să mergem mai departe înainte. Ar fi ciudat să rămânem pe loc.

Fără îndoială că e în interesul României ca provincia Kosovo să rămână parte integrantă a Serbiei. Motivele sunt multiple, de la respectul pentru istoria singurei naţiuni care ne-a fost amică mereu, la teama unui precedent care să dea apă la moară secesionismului maghiar, la justeţea poziţiei sârbilor şi aşa mai departe.

La scară geopolitică e un alt joc. Miza reală e supravieţuirea Europei. Pare o vorbă mare, dar nu e aşa.

E limpede că direcţia în care se mişcă istoria este spre consolidarea de mari imperii. Acesta pare să fie singurul mijloc de asigurare a prosperităţii într-o lume dominată de schimburi economice şi financiare masive, precum şi de goana după controlul ultimelor resurse naturale. Se conturează 4 mari blocuri de putere:

• În primul rând Asia, devenită centrul producţiei industriale mondiale după succesul politicii de dezvoltare economică a Chinei.
• America de Nord prin integrarea accelerată a Canadei şi Mexicului cu SUA.
• Urmează Rusia şi rămăşiţele imperiului sovietic, împreună concentrând poate cel mai amplu amestec de resurse.
• Al patrulea bloc e draga noastră Uniune Europeană.

Noi ne-am obişnuit să vedem Europa ca locul bunăstării din care sperăm să avem şi noi o bucăţică. De fapt UE este răspunsul raţional al ţărilor europene la forţa celorlalte centre de putere. La această scară nici Marea Britanie, nici Germania sau Franţa nu înseamnă altceva decât nişte ţări mărunte. Singure vor fi în curând zdrobite economic şi politic. Nu mai vorbesc de ţările europene mai mici sau mai sărmane. Ocuparea sovietică a centrului şi estului Europei după cel de-al doilea război mondial o demonstrează cu prisosinţă. Obiectiv vorbind, Europa e o regiune cu naţiuni îmbătrânite şi cu puţine resurse naturale rămase neexploatate. Astfel ultima carte de jucat e constituirea unui imperiu pan-european.

Conştiinţa naţională, moştenită din secolul 19 este însă principalul obstacol spre imperiu, la care se adaugă specificul local în justiţie şi administraţie. Comunitatea Europeană şi mai nou Uniunea se străduiesc să construiască un specific administrativ pan-european, ca o coloană vertebrală a viitorului stat european.

Legătura cu problema provinciei Kosovo e una indirectă. Azi o atitudine binevoitoare faţă de musulmanii din Europa, la fel ca în cazul Bosniei, se face cu intenţia întoarcerii serviciului de către lumea musulmană care stă în Orientul Mijlociu pe resurse vaste de petrol şi nu numai.

Este de asemenea destul de limpede că statele naţionale sunt un element administrativ inutil pentru viitorul stat european. De aici şi conceptul de Europă a regiunilor, care a fost făcut cu scopul real de a reduce influenţa statelor naţionale existente şi de a le substitui în timp cu regiuni ca unităţi teritorial administrative ale statului european. Aşa ceva ia însă timp şi tact, pentru că e împotriva unor sentimente foarte puternice. În acest context naţionalismul hotărât al sârbilor deranjează pentru că poate fi un model de urmat de către cei care se împotrivesc curentului. Din punctul de vedere al celor care gestionează planul viitorului stat european, a se pleca în faţa sensibilităţilor naţionale ale oricui, în pofida situaţiei demografice din teren, ar fi un semn de slăbiciune şi un pas înapoi din direcţia în care au mandat să meargă. Tot aşa faptul că un stat kosovar independent e neviabil nu are importanţă, pentru că nici nu trebuie să aibă viaţă lungă. Doar până când va fi absorbit în imperiu.